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Many studies have shown that people have difficulty judging the diagnostic value of conditional 
probability information with respect to one or more hypotheses. The present research addressed 
two aspects of performing the diagnostic task in a health care decision: (a) recognition of the 
information’s importance, and (b) correct usage of that information. In experiment 1, health care 
providers, who are trained in, and regularly exposed, to conditional probabilities imparting 
diagnostic information, exhibited at least a rudimentary recognition of the need for this informa- 
tion in assessing diagnosticity. Experiment 2 indicated that health care and layperson subjects had 
difficulty in actually applying the information, however. This difficulty prompts a need for 
judgment aids and caution in using diagnostic information. 
An ongoing area of concern to researchers is the updating of 
judgments in light of diagnostic evidence. Bayes’ Theorem has been 
pivotal to this research. In odds form, Bayes’ Theorem states: 
(1) 
Alternately: 
L? posterior = S2prior x L’ 
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The first term, the posterior odds, expresses the likelihood of the 
hypothesis H relative to its complement, after receiving the diagnostic 
evidence E. The second term in the equation, the prior odds or base 
rate, expresses the same judgment prior to the diagnostic evidence. The 
final term, the likelihood ratio, expresses the diagnosticity of the 
evidence with respect to the hypothesis H. 
Early studies showed ‘conservatism’ in the use of diagnostic sample 
information (Edwards 1968; Phillips and Edwards 1966; reviews in 
Rapoport and Wallsten 1972; Slavic and Lichtenstein 1971). Subse- 
quently, studies have consistently demonstrated that people do not 
intuitively use Bayes’ Theorem in applying the diagnosticity of availa- 
ble information to the evaluation of a hypothesis (Fischhoff and 
Beyth-Marom 1983; Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Slavic et al. 1977). 
Attention has subsequently focused upon usage of the two terms on the 
right side of eq. (1). Most of this attention has been directed toward use 
of prior odds, or base rate, information (Ajzen 1977; Bar-Hillel 1980; 
Medin and Edelson 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1980). The present 
paper addresses the diagnosticity portion of the right side of eq. (l), 
embodied in the likelihood ratio. 
Two questions are of interest with respect to diagnostic conditional 
probability information. First, do individuals correctly recognize what 
specific diagnosticity information is needed in evaluating the hypothe- 
ses, and to what extent? Second, whether or not they recognize the need 
for the essential information, can they correctly use that information if 
it is supplied? 
An exemplar diagnosticity judgment task is illustrated by the display 
in table 1. Subjects were to decide which of the two diagnoses, disease 
A or B, was more likely. They were provided with one piece of 
information. In table 1, the percentage of those with disease A who 
show the symptom of fever is 66%; 34% of those with disease A do not 
have fever. To help the subjects in their selection, one additional item 
Table 1 
Exemplar diagnosticity task 
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of information - Xl, X2, or X3 - was offered. The normative response 
is Xl, the percentage of those with disease B who show the symptom of 
fever. This item would allow determination of the diagnosticity of the 
sign ‘fever’ for the two diseases. Typically, subjects do not select this 
item (Wolf et al. 1985). They tend to prefer the information in cell X2, 
and then use it as if it were diagnostic, behavior labelled ‘pseudodi- 
agnosticity’ (Doherty et al. 1979). Einhorn and Hogarth (1978; Einhorn 
1980) have suggested that this behavior might arise from the general 
lack of cell Xl information in the environment. 
One difficulty with the pseudodiagnosticity studies is their restriction 
of subjects to only one additional piece of information. Natural en- 
vironments are not usually so constrained. However, Beyth-Marom and 
Fischhoff (1983) allowed any number of requests, and their results 
corroborated the findings: subjects were reluctant to select P( E 1 E) 
information. Further, when offered reasons for selecting the different 
pieces of information, even subjects who selected P( E 1 H) had diffi- 
culty in choosing the appropriate justification from among those pro- 
vided. 
We report two experiments here which extend our knowledge of 
subjects’ ability to understand and use conditional probability indica- 
tors as capturing diagnostic, or contingency, information. The experi- 
ments address the two main questions with respect to diagnostic 
indicators: do subjects recognize the need for them? Can subjects 
correctly use them? 
Experiment 1 generalized the results of Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff 
(1983) with respect to the first of these two questions to physician 
subjects. The medical setting is one in which conditional probabilities 
are readily available. Physicians in medical settings are trained in, and 
regularly see, conditional probability information for clinical tests. The 
information is communicated as test sensitivity, P( T+ 1 D), and test 
specificity, P( T- 10). Those with the disease are D; those without the 
disease are 0. The result of test T is the diagnostic evidence; those who 
test positive are T+; those who test negative are T . Unlike the subjects 
used in prior research, these subjects might well be expected to be 
familiar with the necessity of having this information. 
Subjects in this setting were interrogated with an open request 
format comparable to that used by Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff. Sub- 
jects were allowed to request all pieces of evidence deemed relevant. In 
addition, the subjects provided justifications for their selections. They 
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did this in their own words, rather than being restricted to experi- 
menter-provided responses. Thus, experiment 1 was designed to explore 
the robustness of Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff’s findings by reducing 
various barriers to subjects’ expressions of the importance of diagnostic 
evidence. Experiment 2 addressed the second question of whether 
subjects sufficiently understand the conditional probability information 




Eighteen fourth-year medical students and 34 fellowship physicians from the 
University of Michigan Medical Center served as subjects. The physicians were from a 
variety of medical specialties, comprising a cross-section. The subjects completed the 
task individually, along with several other unrelated tasks, and were paid a fixed fee for 
their participation. 
Procedure 
The instructions to the subjects appear in the appendix. The subjects were informed 
that they were to gather information in their hospital regarding a disease and a 
diagnostic test for that disease. They were offered seven pieces of information for 
which to search, and were to avoid irrelevant and redundant information. For each 
item, subjects indicated whether or not they would order a search for that item, and 
why or why not. The items of information were described in words, and corresponded 
to the following: P(D), P(D), P( T+ 1 D), P(T- 1 D), P( T+ 1 o), P(T- 1 o), P(T). 
T represents those receiving the test, regardless of test outcome. This probability 
notation was not presented to the subjects. 
The first two items are base rate information, and one is redundant given the other. 
Similar redundancies exist for the conditional probabilities. To assess the diagnosticity 
of the test T, the subject needed two of the four conditional probabilities, e.g., 
P(Tf 1 D) and P(T+ 10). The probabilities P(T+ I D) and P(T- I D) are redundant, 
as are the probabilities P(T+ 10) and P( Tp 10). Redundant items were used as a 
manipulation check for the instruction that items were costly. 
The subjects' justifications for their selections were coded by two independent, blind 
coders. The coders were instructed to be highly sensitive to the justifications as 
indicative of a general understanding of the proper use of the information. That is, the 
coders were to settle in the subject’s favor in rating the justifications. This provided a 
conservative estimate of the proportion of subjects who were unable to express the 
need for the diagnostic information. The coders agreed upon 131 of the 138 responses 
presented to them. The inter-rater reliability of 94.9% was taken to be acceptable. 
Responses for which there was no agreement were not included in the analyses as 
described below. 
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Table 2 
Requests and justifications for available diagnostic information (experiment 1). 
Information pairs 
Base rate Sensitivity Specificity 
P(D); P(D) P(T+ 1 D); P(T- 1 D) P(T+ IO); P(T_ 10) 
Number (Sg) requesting at 41/52 51/52 52/52 
least one of this pair (78.85g) (98.1%) (100%) 
Number (I%) of these with 34/36 a 46/47 b 46/48 b 
justification consistent (94.4%) (97.9%) (95.8%) 
with proper use 
Nore: D = those with the disease. 5 = those without the disease. T+ = those who test positive. 
T- = those who test negative. 
a Two subjects did not provide justifications, and the two raters disagreed on three subjects’ 
justifications. These five are omitted. 
b Two subjects did not provide justifications, and the two raters disagreed on two subjects’ 
justifications. These four are omitted. 
Results and Discussion 
* 
The manipulation check indicated that subjects heeded the instruction that there 
was a search cost. Only 2/52 (3.8%) of the health care providers requested all seven 
pieces of information; they did discriminate. However, their discrimination was not 
uniform. Subjects had particular difficulty acknowledging the redundancy of the 
conditional probability information. Of the remaining 50 subjects, 5 (10%) requested 
both base rate items, 26 (52%) requested both P(T+ 1 D) and P(T- 1 D), 23 (46%) 
requested both P(T+ 10) and P(T- 10). Out of 50, 22 (44%) subjects correctly 
recognize_d that they-needed exactly one from each pair [ p(T+ 1 D), p(T- 1 D)] and 
[p(T+ ID)> p(T- I D)l. 
The item requests, shown in the upper half of table 2, indicated that the health care 
subjects recognized that conditional probability information was needed to determine 
diagnosticity. At least one of the base rate items was selected by 78.8% of the subjects; 
98.1% selected at least one of P(T* 1 D) or P(T- ) D); and, all 52 subjects selected at 
least one of P(T+ 10) or P(T- 10). The percentage selecting conditional likelihood 
information significantly differed from the percentage seeking base rate information 
(using Cochran’s (1950) test of proportions from matched samples, Q(l) = 10.0, 
p < 0.01) underscoring the subjects’ recognition that likelihood data were useful. 
Further, of the subjects who selected the items, nearly all of them gave a justifica- 
tion which was at least broadly consistent with the proper usage of that information 
within a Bayesian updating procedure, as determined by the coders (lower half of table 
2). Examples of subjects’ correct justifications included: 
[P(D), P(z):1 
This gives the incidence of disease in your population. 
Prevalence of disease important in a screening situation. 
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This information is needed to establish the sensitivity of the test. 
Need to get true positive rate of test. 
To evaluate the diagnostic test for the disease. 
[P(T+ IO), P(T- IO):] 
To determine the false positive rate. 
Must know specificity of the test in order not to rely too heavily on results. 
How useful is the test--if all test positive it is not useful. 
As these examples indicate, the health care subjects had at least a minimal awareness of 
what the information represented. They typically communicated this understanding 
using the ‘sensitivity’ and ‘specificity’ labels for the described conditional probabilities. 
In summary, there was an indication that the health care subjects had some 
understanding that the conditional probability information was needed to evaluate a 
diagnostic test. They could generally correctly tie the conditional probability state- 
ments to the clinical constructs of sensitivity and specificity in recognition of the 
information’s usefulness. The redundancy of requests, however, suggested some diffi- 
culty in understanding the information. If this misunderstanding existed, we would also 
expect it to manifest itself in attempts to use the information. The issue of how subjects 




The subjects described in experiment 1, plus two additional fellowship physicians, 
completed the task individually. Also from the Medical Center, 29 chief medical 
residents gathered for a short course were enlisted. Extending beyond health care 
providers, 208 undergraduates from the University of Michigan took part in small 
groups. All but the chief residents were paid a set fee for participating. 
Procedure 
Each subject received a base rate, P( D), and diagnostic test information, P( Tt 1 D) 
and P(T+ IO), all described in words. The subjects did not see probability notation. 
The subject’s task was to judge the probability of disease after receiving a positive test 
result, by placing a slash through a scale anchored at 0 and 100. The instructions for 
experiment 2 are included in the appendix. 
There were two considerations in our design. First, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff 
(1983) suggested that subjects are able to use diagnostic information properly. How- 
ever, these investigators used a limited class of diagnostic values. Only probabilities 
opposite_and equidistant from P = 0.50 were included, e.g., P(T+ 1 D) = 0.70 and 
P(T+ ID) = 0.30. We wanted to extend their conclusions to a wider class of values. 
For example, it may be that subjects implicitly, and incorrectly, assume that P(Tf 10) 
= 1 - P(T+ I D), and behave accordingly. 
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Table 3 
Experimental conditions and ‘rationally’ predicted direction for revising the probability of disease 
for each condition (experiment 2). 
Experimental 
condition 
P(T+ ID) P(T+ 15) Predicted 
revision 
30/- 0.30 (omitted) ? 
30/70 0.30 0.70 Down 
30/50 0.30 0.50 Down 
30/10 0.30 0.10 UP 
70/- 0.70 (omitted) ? 
70/30 0.70 0.30 UP 
70/50 0.70 0.50 UP 
70/90 0.70 0.90 Down 
A complementary consideration was to test the hypothesis that subjects with 
incomplete diagnosticity information (for example, in the design described by table 1) 
implicitly fill in the missing value. Thus, subjects who only have P(T+ 1 D) would 
assume a value for P(T+ 10) and respond on this basis. In particular, a pilot study 
suggested the complement of P( T+ ID) as a likely assumption for the missing value of 
P(T+ lo). The present experiment contained two conditions in which subjects re- 
ceived only partial diagnostic evidence. 
Eight combinations of the conditional probabilities were used in the present study. 
In all cases, P(D) = 0.50 was given. As indicated by table 3, four groups saw 
P( T+ ( D) = 0.70, with one group each receiving P( T+ ) 0) values of 0.90, 0.50, 0.30, 
and one group for whom this second conditional probability was not given. Also, four 
groups saw P( T+ 1 D) = 0.30, with one group each receiving P(T+ ( 0) values of 0.10, 
0.50, 0.70, and one group for whom this conditional probability was missing. Thus, 
there were eight conditions of the study in a between-subjects design. 
Results and Discussion 
Subjects’ use of diagnostic information can be compared to that prescribed by 
Bayes’ Theorem (table 5). However, given the time and complexity entailed in using eq. 
(1) we should not expect subjects to be accurate intuitive Bayesians in the present task. 
Instead, a more basic property of rational information usage was deemed more 
meaningful. If P(T+ ( D) > P(T+ 1 o), then an individual should revise P(D) upward 
upon receiving a positive test result, since T+ IS more likely to occur if the patient has 
the dise_ase than if the patient does not have the disease. Similarly, if P(T+ 1 D) < 
P(T+ 1 D), then an individual should revise P(D) downward. These predictions are 
indicated in tables 3 and 4 for each condition. As a corollary, the greater the 
discrepancy between P( T+ ( D) and P(T+ ) o), the greater should be the revision. 
These principles for the use of diagnostic evidence have normative appeal independent 
of Bayes’ Theorem. If subjects’ diagnostic judgments were rational, they should reflect 
these principles. Did they? 
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Table 4 
Nonparametric analyses (experiment 2): Response frequencies and direction of revision for the 
probability of disease by each group. 








30/- 29 6 19” 
30/70 24 4 16” 
30/50 29 2 2ob 
30/10 29 6 20= 
70/- 45 35 7h 
70/30 45 31 9h 
70/50 46 31 7h 

















Nate: The binomial distribution was used for Ha: Proportion shifting Up = Proportion shifting 
Down. 
a p < 0.02; b p i 0.001. 
No reliable differences were observed among any of the subject groups; therefore, 
the data from all 291 subjects were pooled and analyzed together. Table 4 shows the 
numbers of subjects who revised the probability of disease either upward or downward 
in response to the diagnostic evidence for each of the eight conditions of the study. The 
nonparametric analyses in table 4 illustrate that the modal direction of revision was 
consistently in the direction of P(Tf 1 D). Table 5 shows the mean posterior judgments 
for each condition. The parametric analyses were corroborative. Columns 4 and 5 
indicate that subjects typically were shifting from the base rate of P(D) = 0.50 in the 
Table 5 
Parametric analyses (experiment 2): Mean revised probability of disease for each group 
Condition n P( D 1 T+) using Mean P(DIT’) 
Bayes’ Theorem Judgment vs. 0.50 d vs. Bayes h 
30/- 29 ? 
30/70 24 0.30 
30/50 29 0.375 
30/10 29 0.75 
70/- 45 ? 
70/30 45 0.70 
70/50 46 0.625 
70/90 44 0.25 
0.399 c 
0.409 d d”p 
0.385 r 
0.378 d I 
0.654 f 
0.589 r rp 
0.556 d r 
0.544 I 
a The r( n - 1) statistic was used for H,,: mean judged P( D 1 T+) = P(D) = 0.50. 
’ The t(n - 1) statistic was used for Ho: mean judged P(D 1 T+) = P( D 1 T+) using Bayes’ 
Theorem (‘np’ signifies that test was not performed). 
c p,o.o5; dp<O.O1;.~p<O.OO1; ‘p~0.0001. 
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direction of P(T+ ) D), and column 6 supports that the shift was not generally in 
accord with the revision prescribed by Bayes’ Theorem. 
Overall, the most striking observation is that the subjects’ responses were relatively 
insensitive to the value of P(T* 1 D). In fact, there was no difference across conditions 
70/30, 70/50, and 70/90 (F(2, 132) = 0.99, p > O.lO), or across conditions 30/70, 
30/50, and 30/10 (F(2, 79) = 0.27, p ) 0.10). (Nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
differences led to the same results with p > 0.30 and p > 0.20, respectively.) Contrary 
to the performance of subjects in the Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1983) study, 
subjects had difficulty using diagnostic information in the present task. Subjects did 
not distinguish differences in P( T+ ) z), despite the fact that some of these conditions 
should have differed qualitatively and sharply. Because no differences were observed 
across levels of P( T+ ( o), the attempt to identify implicitly assumed values of this 
quantity when missing was not relevant. Indeed, the subjects’ judgments could be 
well-described as arising from a simple strategy whereby, if P(T+ ) D) > 0.50, then the 
revision was upward; and, if P(Tf I D) < 0.50, then the revision was downward. 
General discussion 
Individuals have been shown to have difficulty in correctly using 
diagnostic information. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978; Einhorn 1980) 
have implicated the absence of this information in subjects’ experience 
as underlying difficulty in its use. Unlike previous results using less 
experienced subjects, we found that health care subjects did have some 
recognition of the need for the appropriate conditional probability 
information for judging diagnosticity. Physicians are schooled in the 
use of, and regularly see, this information in the form of the sensitivity 
and specificity of diagnostic tests; and they have at least a rudimentary 
understanding of its necessity. However, knowledge of how to apply 
this information is less established. Difficulty with the use of the 
information was suggested by the high number of redundant requests 
in experiment 1, and verified more directly in experiment 2. 
Both health care and layperson subjects in experiment 2 were insen- 
sitive to one of the conditional probabilities, P(T+ (o), in making 
diagnosticity judgments. This insensitivity led to violations of a basic 
principle, which states that a test is diagnostic in favor of the hypothe- 
sis for which the result is more likely, either D or 0. This principle has 
prescriptive force independent of any particular rule for transforming 
the conditional probabilities into a single judgment of diagnostic im- 
pact, e.g., Bayes’ Theorem. 
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Table 6 
Levels of increasing abstraction and structuring (top to bottom) of contingency information. 




A. Frequency list 
B. Organized presentation 
3. Indicators 
A. Conditional probabilities 
B. Single number/contingency index 
For a wider perspective on these findings, note that this and other 
studies of individuals’ judgments with diagnostic information are con- 
ceptually related to a series of contingency judgment experiments. In 
the most basic contingency judgment task, the co-occurrence of levels 
of two dichotomous variables is the covariation of interest. The subject 
receives data concerning the frequencies with which instances of each 
of the four combinations of the two variables occur. A judgment of the 
existence and strength of the relationship between the two variables is 
requested. Subjects have been found to have difficulty with this task, as 
well (Arkes and Harkness 1983; Beyth-Marom 1982; Cracker 1981; 
Curley et al. 1988). In the diagnosticity task, a similar contingency 
judgment is required, for example, between the diseases and signs in 
table 1. The task differs only in the level of structure in the data. 
Table 6 shows successive levels of increasing abstraction and struc- 
ture. The data instances themselves are the most concrete and least 
structured form of contingency information. In this form (form l), the 
data may be observed sequentially, or all at once. The physician’s 
everyday practice exemplifies receiving information in this form, 
sequentially, case-by-case. More abstract is a count or tally of the data 
instances, which may be more or less organized (form 2). The tabular 
form in table 1 exemplifies an organized frequency presentation for- 
mat. 
More compactly, the data can be described using indicators. It is 
with data of this form that diagnosticity studies are concerned. In form 
3A, the data are described as pairs of conditional probabilities. The 
sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test are data at this level of 
abstraction. In form 3B, the data are structured even further into a 
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single contingency indicator, for example, as a correlation coefficient or 
posterior probability. In the diagnosticity context of the present experi- 
ments, the subjects had difficulty in transforming contingency informa- 
tion from form 3A, information concerning P( T+ ID) and P( T+ 1 ?I), 
to the single indicator form 3B, a posterior probability in light of test 
information. 
It is therefore indicated that individuals would benefit from prescrip- 
tive aids in using diagnostic information at this level of abstraction. 
Recent attention to the likelihood ratio, a single indicator capturing the 
essential implications of both conditional probabilities, as useful for 
understanding clinical findings is justified by the current findings (cf. 
Sackett et al. 1985). For example, a test relative to a particular disease 
could be summagzed as having 80% sensitivity P(T+ 1 D), 60% 
specificity P( T- 1 D), and a likelihood ratio of 2. That is, in the sample, 
a positive test result was twice as likely to be found among diseased 
patients than among patients without the disease. We need to explore 
more understandable summaries of diagnosticity, rather than relying on 
judgment and intuitive understanding. 
The results also highlight particular situations in which the misuse of 
diagnostic evidence, e.g., from a laboratory test, is expected to be most 
pronounced. In selecting among tests, an insensitivity to values of 
P( Tt ) 0) would adversely influence the relative evaluations of tests 
having differing sensitivities and specificities. With respect to individ- 
ual tests, it is true that cases in whichthere is high sensitivity (P( T+ 1 D) 
is large) but low specificity (P( Tt ID) is also large) rarely occur, if at 
all. However, cases at the other end are common, i.e., those in which 
the diagnostic evidence has low sensitivity (P( T+ ( D) is small) but 
high specificity ( P( T+ I 0) is also small). A test having these properties 
would be particularly open to misinterpretation and misuse. 
Appendix 
Question text: Experiment 1 
Suppose you are attempting to gather information in your hospital regarding a 
particular disease and a diagnostic test for that disease. The information must be 
gathered by a chart review of cases in your hospital. The process is both costly and 
time-consuming, so you should be sure that the information to be gathered is informa- 
tive. Specifically, you want to avoid irrelevant or redundant information. 
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Many patients are admitted to your hospital from suspicion of the disease of 
interest. You can order a search for each of the following items of information in this 
group of patients. However, each of the items would involve conducting a separate 
search. For which of the following items would you request such a search in this group 
of patients? 
(1) The percentage of these patients who have the disease? 
(2) The percentage of these patients who do not have the disease? 
(3) The percentage of those with the disease who test positive? 
(4) The percentage of those with the disease who test negative? 
(5) The percentage of those without the disease who test positive? 
(6) The percentage of those without the disease who test negative? 
(7) The percentage of these patients who receive the test? 
Question Text: Experiment 2 
You are seeing a patient in whom you suspect coronary disease. After the history 
and initial examination, you determine that: If you were to see 100 patients like this 
one, you would expect 50 of them to have significant coronary obstruction. 
You are now evaluating the results of a new diagnostic test for coronary disease. 
You have the following information about this new test with respect to patients with 
suspected coronary disease. 
The percentage of those with significant coronary obstruction who test positive is 
# # out of 100. 
The percentage of those without significant coronary obstruction who test positive is 
# # out of 100. 
Suppose your patient receives a positive test. Given this result, if you were to see 
100 patients like this one, in how many of them would you expect to find significant 
coronary obstruction? 
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